Did Stalin demand any territory from Turkey?

Speech of the First Secretary of the CK of the KPSS, N. S. Chruščev on the XX. Party congress of the KPSS ["Secret Speech"] and the decision of the party congress "On the cult of personality and its consequences", February 25, 1956

Source text German

Enjoyed! In the annual report of the CK the party to the XX. Party congress, in a number of speeches by party congress delegates and previously at plenary sessions of the Central Committee, there is not a little about the Personality cult and its harmful consequences have been spoken of.

After death Stalin's the party's CK began to carry out a policy precisely and consistently which consisted in demonstrating that it was inadmissible and in line with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism alien is to single out a single person and transform them into some kind of superman with supernatural, god-like qualities. This person supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, is able to do everything, is infallible in his actions.

Such an idea of ​​a person, specifically Stalin, was widespread among us for many years.

The purpose of the following speech is not an all-round assessment of the life and activities of Stalin. A sufficient number of books, brochures and studies were written about Stalin's merits during his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and implementation of the socialist revolution, during the Civil war as well as in the struggle to establish the socialism in our country. Everyone knows that well. At the moment we are concerned with a question that is of tremendous importance for the party both now and in the future - how the cult of the person of Stalin gradually developed, which at a certain stage was the source of a whole series of extremely serious and serious distortions of party principles, intra-party democracy and revolutionary legalism.

In view of the fact that not everyone is aware of where the cult of personality has led in practice, what enormous damage the violation of the principle of collective leadership in the Party and the concentration of immeasurable, unlimited power in the hands of one person, the Central Committee considers it necessary to give XX. Communicate materials to the KPSS Party Congress concerning this matter.

Let me first of all remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism condemned any manifestation of the cult of personality. In a letter to the German political functionary Wilhelm Blos posed Marx firmly: "... in the aversion to all personality cults, I did during the time of International The numerous maneuvers of recognition with which I was molested from various countries never allowed it to penetrate the realm of publicity and I never responded to it, except here and there by Rüffel. Engels and I first entered the secret communist society on the condition that everything that was conducive to superstition in authority would be removed from the statutes. (Lassalle later worked in the opposite direction.) "

Angel wrote a little later: "Both Marx and I have always been against all public demonstrations that are linked to individual persons, unless they pursued a great aim; and most of all against demonstrations that took place during our lifetime our own people would turn. "

The enormous modesty of the genius of the revolution is known, Vladimir Il'ič Lenin. Lenin always underlined the role of the people as the creator of history, the leading and organizing role of the party as a living and creative organism, and the role of the Central Committee.

At the same time he ruthlessly denounced any manifestation of personality cult, he led a relentless fight against the views of the alien to Marxism Social Revolutionaries about "heroes" and "masses", against attempts to juxtapose "heroes" on the one hand and masses and people on the other.

Lenin taught that the strength of the party rests on an unbreakable alliance with the masses and on the fact that the people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia - follow the party. "Only he will win and maintain power," said Lenin, "who believes in the people, who will dive to the bottom of the people's living creativity."

Lenin spoke of it with pride Bolshevik, communist Party as a leader and teacher of the people, he called for all decisive questions to be submitted to the conscious workers and their party for judgment; He said: "We believe in the party, in it we see the reason, the honor and the conscience of our epoch."

Lenin resolutely opposed all attempts to diminish or weaken the leading role of the party in the system of the Soviet state. He elaborated Bolshevik principles of leadership of the party and the norms of party life, underlining that the leading principle of leadership of the party is its collectivity. Even in the years before the revolution, Lenin described the party's Central Committee as a collective of leaders, a guardian and interpreter of party principles. "The Central Committee watches over the principles of the party," remarked Lenin, "from party congress to party congress and interprets them."

Underlining the role of the Party's Central Committee and its authority, Vladimir Il'ič noted: "Our CK has developed into a strictly centralized group that enjoys high authority."

During Lenin's lifetime, the Central Committee was a real expression of the collective leadership of the party and the country. As a Marxist revolutionary fighter who was always inflexible on questions of principle, Lenin never forcibly forced his views on his colleagues. He was convincing and patiently explained his opinion to others. Lenin was always attentive to the fact that the norms of party life were put into practice, that the statutes of the party were observed, and that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee were convened on the appropriate date.

In addition to all the great deeds that V.I. Lenin for the victory of the working class and the toiling peasantry, for the victory of our party and the realization of the ideas of scientific communism, his acuteness also found expression in the fact that he discovered precisely these negative qualities in Stalin in good time, which later had serious consequences led. Concerned about the future fate of the party and the Soviet state, V.I. Lenin was a perfectly correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that the question of the replacement of Stalin from the position of General Secretary should be considered in connection with the fact that Stalin was too rude, did not pay proper attention to his comrades, was capricious and his power abuse.

In December 1922, Vladimir Il'ič wrote in a letter to the party congress: "Gen. Stalin has after he Secretary General has become, an immeasurable power concentrated in his hands, and I am not convinced that he will always be able to use that power carefully enough. "

This letter - a political document of considerable weight, which in the party history as "Lenin's Testament" is known - was the delegates of the XX. Handed out to the party congress. You have read it and will certainly read it again and again. Reconsider the simple words of Lenin that express Vladimir Il'ič's concern for the party, the people, the state and the broader direction of party politics.

Vladimir Il'ič said:

"Stalin is too rough, and this deficiency, which is quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings between us Communists, cannot be tolerated in the function of General Secretary. That is why I suggest that comrades think about how to replace Stalin and to put someone else in this place who differs from Gen. Stalin only in one advantage, namely that he is more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to his comrades, less capricious, and so on. "

This Lenin document was presented to the delegations to the XIII. Took note of the party congress that discussed the question of the replacement of Stalin from the post of general secretary. The delegations spoke out in favor of Stalin's remaining in this post, expecting that he would heed Vladimir Il'ič's critical remarks and overcome his mistakes, which had aroused Lenin's serious misgivings.

Enjoyed! The party congress was due to familiarize itself with two new documents which complete the assessment of Stalin made by Lenin in his "Testament".

These documents - that's a letter from Nadežda Konstantinovna Krupskaja at Kamenevthat at that time Chairman of the Politburo as well as a personal letter from Vladimir Il'ič Lenin to Stalin.

I read these documents:

1. The letter from N. K. Krupskaja:

"Lev Borisovič, because of the short letter that Vlad. Il'ič dictated to me with the permission of the doctors, Stalin took the liberty of making a serious mistake with me yesterday. I haven't just been in the party since yesterday. In all thirty years I have never heard a single rude word from any comrade. The interests of the party and the Il'ičs are no less dear to me than they are to Stalin. I now need maximum self-control. I know what you can and cannot talk about with Il'ič I do better than any doctor, because I know what upsets him and what doesn't, in any case I know that better than Stalin. I address you and Grigory as comrades who are closer to VI than others, and I ask you to do so to protect against gross interference in my private life, against unworthy insults and threats. I have no doubt about the unanimous decision of the control commission, which Stalin allowed himself to threaten. But I have neither the strength nor the time to deal with this du to deal with intrigues. I'm a living person, too, and my nerves are tense.

N. Krupskaya. "

Nadežda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on December 23, 1922. After two and a half months, in March 1923, Lenin sent the following letter to Stalin:

2. Letter from W. I. Lenin:

"To comrade Stalin.

Strictly confidential.


Copy to Comrades Kamenev and Zinov'ev

Dear Gen. Stalin!

They had the rudeness of calling my wife on the phone and berating her. Although she agreed to you to forget what was said, Zinov'ev and Kamenev found out about this fact through herself. It is not my intention to easily forget what was done to me, and of course I see what was done to my wife as something that was done to me too. Therefore, I ask you to consider whether you are willing to take what has been said and apologize, or whether you prefer to break off relations between us.

Sincerely, Lenin

March 5, 1923. "

Enjoyed! I will not comment on these documents. They speak for themselves. If Stalin was able to behave in this way during Lenin's lifetime, if he could behave in this way towards Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, who is known in the party and highly valued as a loyal companion of Lenin and an active fighter for the cause of our party from the beginning one can imagine how Stalin treated other employees. These negative properties of his developed more and more and in the last few years assumed an absolutely unbearable character.

As later events have shown, Lenin's concern was well founded: for the first time after Lenin's death, Stalin still obeyed his instructions, but later he began to take the serious warnings of Vladimir Il'ič lightly.

If we analyze the practice used by Stalin in the leadership of the party and the state, if we think about everything that Stalin has allowed, then we convince ourselves that Lenin's fears were justified. Stalin's negative traits, which were only in the bud in Lenin's time, have in recent years developed into a grave abuse of power, causing immeasurable damage to our party.

We have to think through this question seriously and analyze it properly in order to rule out any possibility of a repetition, in whatever form, of what happened during Stalin's lifetime, the collective leadership and work that absolutely could not endure the brutal violence against everything allowed what was not only directed against him, but what seemed to him, with his capricious and despotic inclination, to contradict his conceptions. Stalin did not act by means of conviction, explanation, patient work with the people, but by imposing his conceptions by demanding absolute subordination to his opinion. Who opposed or tried; Establishing one's own point of view and the correctness of one's point of view was condemned to expulsion from the leadership collective and consequently to moral and physical annihilation. So it was especially in the period after the XVII. Party congress when the despotism of Stalin fell victim to many honest, outstanding party functionaries and simple party workers who were devoted to the cause of communism.

It must be stated that the party is engaged in a serious struggle against the Trotskyists, the deviants, the bourgeois nationalists led that it ideologically crushed all enemies of Leninism. This ideological struggle was waged successfully, and in its course the party strengthened and steeled itself even more. Here Stalin played a positive role.

The party waged a great ideological-political struggle against those in its ranks who put forward anti-Leninist theses representing a political line alien to the party and the cause of socialism. It was a persistent and difficult but necessary struggle as the political line of both the Trotskyist-Zinov'ev block as well as the Bukharin people would basically have led to the re-establishment of capitalism, to surrender to the world bourgeoisie. Let us imagine what would have happened if in the years 1928/1929 our party followed the political line Deviation to law would have won, the orientation towards the "calico industrialization", towards the Kulaks and the like. We wouldn't have any powerful heavy industry, none Collective farms, we would have been defenseless and powerless in the face of capitalist encirclement.

This is the reason why the party waged a ruthless ideological struggle, explaining to all party members and the non-party masses what the harmfulness and danger of the anti-Leninist appearances of the Trotskyist opposition and right-wing opportunists consisted of. And this tremendous work of clarifying the party line has been successful: both the Trotskyists and the right-wing opportunists were politically isolated, the overwhelming majority of the party supported the Lenin line, and the party managed to get the working masses to realize the Lenin line, for the Mobilize and organize the building of socialism.

Attention needs to be paid to the fact that even in the course of the bitter ideological struggle against the Trotskyists, Zinov'ev people, Bukharin people and others did not use extremely repressive means. The struggle took place on ideological grounds. But after a few years, when socialism was actually already established in our country, when the exploiting classes were in principle liquidated, when the social structure of Soviet society had changed in a radical way, when the social basis for hostile parties and political directions had changed and groupings had narrowed enormously when the party's ideological opponents had long since been politically crushed, then began against them Repression.

And it was precisely in this period (the years 1935 to 1937) that the state began to practice mass reprisals, first of all against the opponents of Leninism: against the Trotskyists, the Zinov'ev people and the Bukharin people, who had long been politically crushed by the party , later also to many honest communists, to those party cadres who had to bear the heavy burden of the civil war and of the first and most difficult years of the industrialization and collectivization on their shoulders who had actively fought against the Trotskyists and right-wing deviants for a Leninist party line.

Stalin introduced the term "Enemy of the people" a. This term immediately freed from the need to prove the ideological faults of one or more people against whom one had polemicized; he allowed the most terrible repression to be used, against all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who disagreed with Stalin in anything, who merely suspects opposing intentions, who has simply been slandered.This term "enemy of the people" basically excluded the possibility of any ideological struggle or of expressing one's own views on this or that question, including practical content. Contrary to all norms of today's legal doctrine, the "confession" of the convicted was regarded as the main and basically only proof of guilt.

This led to a blatant violation of revolutionary legality, to the victimization of many totally innocent people who had defended the party line in the past.

It must be stated that those who opposed the party line at the time often did not have a sufficiently serious basis for physically annihilating them. To justify the physical extermination of such persons, the formula of the "enemy of the people" was introduced.

After all, many people who were later exterminated because they were viewed as enemies of the Party and the people had V.I. Lenin cooperated with this. Some of these people had also made mistakes in Lenin's time, but despite this Lenin benefited from their work, corrected them, tried to keep them within the framework of the party, to continue to associate with him.

In connection with this, the party congress delegates should make a previously unpublished comment by V.I. Lenin's acquaintance, which he sent to the in October 1920 Politburo of the CK judged. When specifying the tasks of the Control Commission Lenin wrote that this commission should be made "a real organ of the conscience of the party and the proletariat".

"A special task is recommended to the control commission," it says in this note, "the representatives of the so-called opposition who go through a mental crisis in connection with the failures in their party or state career, attentive and individualizing, sometimes even directly like the sick One must try to calm them down, explain the matter to them in a comradely manner, find them a job (not by way of orders) that corresponds to their psychological peculiarities; advice and pointers are to be given to the organizational office of the CK on this point , etc. "

Everyone knows well how irreconcilable Lenin was towards the ideological opponents of Marxism, towards those who deviated from the right party line. At the same time, however, as one can see from the document read out and from the entire practice of his leadership of the party, Lenin demanded an extremely sensitive, partisan relationship with people who fluctuated or deviated from the party line, but who were on the could lead back partisan way. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without using extreme means.

This expressed Lenin's cleverness in approaching people, in working with cadres.

A completely different relationship with people was characteristic of Stalin. The Leninist qualities were completely alien to Stalin; patient work with people, their persistent and laborious upbringing, the ability to win over people not by means of coercion, but by means of their ideological influence by the entire collective. He rejected the Leninist method of conviction and education, went from the position of ideological struggle via administrative violence to mass reprisals, the path of terror. Increasingly and more and more persistently he made the organs of punishment his tool, often trampling on all existing norms of morality and Soviet law.

The arbitrariness of a single person stimulated others to arbitrary and made it possible. Mass arrests and deportations of thousands of people, executions without trial and without normal investigation created a state of uncertainty and fear, even despair.

Of course, this did not serve to unite the ranks of the party and all strata of the working people; on the contrary, it resulted in the liquidation, the expulsion of honest workers from the party who, however, were inconvenient to Stalin.

Our party fought for the realization of Lenin's plans for the establishment of socialism. It was an ideological struggle. If in the course of this struggle the Leninist principles had been adhered to, if the firmness of party principles had been skilfully combined with a sensitive and caring relationship with the people, if an attempt had been made to draw them to our side instead of repelling and losing them - then it would be Certainly we did not lead to such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality, to the use of terrorist methods against many thousands of people. Extraordinary means would then only have been used against those who had actually committed crimes against the Soviet order.

Let us recall some historical facts.

In the days leading up to the October Revolution, two members of the CK of the Bolshevik Party - Kamenev and Zinov'ev - opposed Lenin's plan for armed insurrection. What's more, on October 18, they published in the Menshevik newspaper "Novaja žizn '" a statement of the Bolsheviks' preparation for the insurrection and of the fact that they viewed the insurrection as an adventure. With this, Kamenev and Zinov'ev revealed to the enemy the CK's decision on the question of the uprising and its organization in the very near future.

That was a betrayal of the party cause, of the revolutionary cause. V.I. Lenin wrote in connection with this: "Kamenev and Zinov'ev have to Rodzjanko and Kerensky betrayed the decision of the CK of their party on the armed insurrection. "He submitted to the CK the question of the expulsion of Zinov'ev and Kamenev from the party.

As is well known, however, Zinov'ev and Kamenev were installed in leading positions after the Great October Socialist Revolution. Lenin included them in the execution of the most responsible orders of the party, in the active work of the leading organs of the party and the Soviet state. It is known that Zinov'ev and Kamenev made many other serious mistakes during Lenin's lifetime. In his "Testament" Lenin warned "that the episode with Zinov'ev and Kamenev in October was of course not a coincidence". But Lenin asked neither the question of their arrest, nor that of their execution.

Or take the example of the Trotskyists. Now that a sufficiently long period of history has passed, we can speak calmly about the struggle against the Trotskyists and analyze this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, there were people in Trockij's surroundings who by no means came from a middle-class background. Some of them belonged to the party intelligentsia, and a certain number were recruited from the working class. Many could be cited who had joined the Trotskyists at the time, but the same people had actively participated in the workers' movement and participated in the revolution before the revolution as they had in the consolidation of the gains of that greatest revolution. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and moved to Leninist positions. Was there then the need for the physical annihilation of these people? We are deeply convinced that if Lenin had lived, such an extreme measure would not have been used against many of them.

This is just a few historical facts. And can it be said that Lenin would not have chosen to take the strictest steps against enemies of the revolution when it was really necessary? No, nobody can say that. Vladimir Il'ič demanded ruthless accounting with enemies of the revolution and the working class, and when necessary he used such means ruthlessly. For example, do you remember the V.I. Lenin against the social-revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet uprisings, against the counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918, and other things when Lenin used the most decisive means against the enemy without hesitation. But Lenin resorted to such means against real class enemies, but not against those who are wrong, who go wrong, who can be reintegrated into the party through ideological influence and even kept in the leadership.

Lenin used sharp means in the bare minimum of cases when exploiting classes existed who fiercely resisted the revolution, as the struggle "who - whom?" inevitably took the sharpest forms, including civil war. Stalin, however, employed the most extreme means, mass repression, when the revolution had triumphed, the Soviet state had been consolidated, when the exploiting classes had already been liquidated and socialist conditions had deepened in all areas of the national economy, when our party had become politically stronger and stronger had steeled both quantitatively and ideologically. It is clear that Stalin displayed intolerance, brutality and abuse of power in a number of cases. Instead of proving that he was politically right and mobilizing the masses, he often took the path of repression and physical annihilation not only against actual enemies but also against people who had not committed crimes against the Party and Soviet power. That wasn't a sign of cleverness, just a demonstration of brutal strength, which is what V.I. Lenin so worried.

The party's Central Committee recently, after unmasking the BeriaGang, discussed a number of cases that this gang fabricated. A very dirty picture of brutal arbitrariness was revealed, which was connected with the unjustified actions of Stalin. As the facts show, Stalin - using his unlimited power - allowed himself many abuses, acting in the name of the CK and not asking the members of the CK or even the members of the Politburo for their opinion, often not even about his individual decisions made in extremely important party and state affairs.

In discussing the question of the personality cult, we must first of all clarify what damage it has done to the interests of our party.

Lenin always underlined the role and importance of the party in the management of the socialist state of workers and peasants, seeing it as the main condition for the successful establishment of socialism in our country. Recalling the tremendous responsibility of the Bolshevik Party as the ruling party of the Soviet state, Lenin appealed to the strictest adherence to the norms of party life, to implement the principles of collectivity in the leadership of the party and the country. The leadership collectivity arises from the very nature of our party, which is based on the principles of democratic centralism.

"That means," said Lenin, "that all party affairs - directly or through representatives - are dealt with equally and without exception by all party members, with all leading functionaries, all leading colleges and all party bodies being elected, accountable and dismissable."

As is well known, Lenin himself gave an example of the strictest observance of these principles. There was no question, however important, on which Lenin himself made the decision without seeking the advice and approval of the majority of the CK members or the members of the CK Politburo.

In a very difficult time for our party and the country, Lenin considered it necessary to hold regular party congresses, party conferences and Plenary session of the Central Committee to convene, in which the most important questions were discussed and resolutions passed, which had been worked out by all leadership collectives.

Let us remember, for example, the year 1918, when the danger of attack by imperialist interveners hung over the country. It was under these conditions that the Seventh Party Congress was convened with the aim of discussing the vital and unstoppable question of peace. In 1919, at the height of the civil war, the Eighth Party Congress was convened, at which a new party program was adopted and such important matters as the attitude towards the masses of the peasantry, the organization of the Red Army, the question of the leading role of the party in the work of Soviets, improving the social composition of the party and other issues. In 1920 the IX. Convened party congress, which determined the tasks of the party and the country in the area of ​​economic construction. In 1921, at the Tenth Party Congress, the one drawn up by Lenin was adopted New economic policy decided and the historic resolution "On Party Unity" was adopted.

During Lenin's lifetime, the party congresses took place regularly; Whenever there was a radical change in the development of party and country, Lenin regarded it as essential that the party discuss the fundamental questions of domestic and foreign policy, the questions of party and state-building.

It is particularly characteristic that Lenin addressed his last articles, letters and remarks to the party congress as the highest organ of the party. In the period between party congresses, the Central Committee acted as the leadership collective with the highest authority, strictly adhering to the principles of the party and implementing its policies.

It was like that in Lenin's lifetime.

After the death of Vladimir Il'ič, were the Leninist principles, which are sacred for our party, observed?

During the first years after Lenin's death, party congresses and plenary sessions of the CK took place more or less regularly, later, when Stalin increasingly misused power, these principles began to be grossly violated. This was particularly evident in the last 15 years of his life. Can one regard the fact as normal that between the XVIII. and XIX. More than 13 years passed during which our party and the country saw so many events? These events urged the party to take decisions to defend the country under the terms of the Patriotic War and to grasp for peaceful rebuilding in the post-war years. Even after the war ended, there was no party convention for more than seven years.

Almost no Central Committee plenary sessions were called. It goes without saying that during all the years of the Great Patriotic War there was practically not a single plenum of the CK. There was an attempt to convene a CK plenum in October 1941, when the members of the CK were summoned to Moscow from all over the country. They waited two days for the plenary session to open, but their wait was in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the members of the CK. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how arrogant and disdainful he treated the members of the CK.

This practice reflected the ignoring of the norms of party life, the violation of Lenin's principle of the collective leadership of the party by Stalin.

Stalin's arrogance towards the party and its central committee came especially after the 17th century. Party convention, which took place in 1934, emerges.

The Central Committee, which has numerous facts testifying to the brutal arbitrariness of the party cadres, has a party commission made up of comrades Pospelov, Aristov, Švernik and Komarov ordered and instructed to investigate exactly how the mass reprisals against the majority of the members and candidates of the CK of the party, which was held by the XVII. Party congress of the VKP (b) was elected, were possible.

The commission made a large number of materials from the archives of the NKVD and familiar with other documents, and it established numerous facts about fabricated charges against communists, false accusations, blatant violations of socialist legality, as a result of which innocent people died. It was revealed that many party workers, Soviet and economic functionaries who were viewed as "enemies" in 1937/1938 were in fact never enemies, spies, vermin, and the like, that in fact they were always honest communists. But they have been denounced and sometimes they could not stand the barbaric tortures and accuse themselves (under the dictates of the forgery-investigating magistrates) of all serious and improbable crimes. The commission has given the Presidium of the CK comprehensive documented material on the mass reprisals against the delegates of the XVII. Congress and the members of the Central Committee elected by this Congress. These materials were reviewed by the Presidium of the Central Committee. The Central Committee considers it necessary to give the XX. To present basic facts on the matter at the party congress.

It was found that of the 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee who attended the XVII. Party congress had been elected, 98 people, d. H.70 percent (mainly in 1937/1938) were arrested and shot.

What was the composition of the delegates to the XVII. Party convention? It is known that 80 percent of the participants at the party congress with a decisive vote had joined the party during the years of underground revolutionary work and the civil war, that is, up to and including the year 1920. As far as the social composition is concerned, workers (60 percent of the delegates with a deciding vote) made up the bulk of the party congress delegates.

It was therefore absolutely unthinkable that the party congress with such a composition would have elected a central committee whose majority turned out to be anti-party. It was only as a result of the fact that honest communists were denigrated and wrongly accused of allowing outrageous violations of revolutionary legality that 70 percent of the members and candidates of the XVII. Party convention elected central committee declared enemies of the party and the people.

The same fate hit not only the members of the CK, but also the majority of the delegates to the XVII. Party congress. Of the 1966 delegates with a decision-making and advisory vote, well over half - 1,108 people - were arrested on the basis of charges of counterrevolutionary crimes. This fact alone testifies to how absurd, absurd and against all common sense the charge of counter-revolutionary crimes was, which - as it now turns out - against the majority of the participants of the XVII. Congress had been brought forward.

It should be remembered that the XVII. Party congress went down in history as the party congress of the winners. The delegates for the party congress were active participants in the construction of our socialist state, many of them fought sacrificially for the cause of the party in the pre-revolutionary years, in the conspiracy and on the fronts of the civil war, fought valiantly against the enemy, often facing death and did not tremble. How then is one to believe that such people passed over to the camp of the enemies of socialism in the period after the political defeat of the Zinov'ev people, Trotskyists and deviants from the law, after the great victories of socialist construction?

This came about as a result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use mass terror against the party cadres.

Why did the mass reprisals against the activists increase after the XVII. Party congress more and more? This is because Stalin at this time placed himself above the party and the people in such a way that he gave nothing at all to the CK or the party. Even if he was before the XVII. While the party congress still respected the opinion of the collective, Stalin paid increasing attention to the unity of the party and the people after the complete political defeat of the Trotskyists, Zinov'ev and Bukharin people, when as a result of this struggle and the victory of socialism the unity of the party and the people was achieved neither the CK members nor the members of the Politburo. Stalin thought that from now on he could decide for himself in all matters and that the rest were only extras; all others were for him only listeners and praise givers.

After the criminal murder S. M. Kirovs Mass repression began and there were brutal acts of violation of socialist legality. On the evening of December 1, 1934, the signed Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive CommitteeEnukidze On the initiative of Stalin (without a decision by the Politburo; this decision was only issued two days later, by circulation procedure) the following order:

"I. It is to be proposed to the investigating authorities that the cases of persons who are accused of preparing or carrying out acts of terrorism be dealt with in a fast-track process.

II. It is to be proposed to the judicial authorities not to postpone the execution of sentences with the maximum penalty in view of appeals for clemency by criminals in this category, since that Presidium of the CIK of the Union of the SSR does not consider it possible to accept such applications for examination.

III. It is to be proposed to the organs of the NKVD of the Union of the SSR that the maximum punishment for criminals of the categories mentioned should be enforced immediately after the verdict has been pronounced. "

This decree formed the basis for mass violations of socialist legality. In many fabricated judicial proceedings, the accused were credited with "preparing" for acts of terrorism, and this deprived the accused of any opportunity to review their affairs even if in court they withdrew the "confessions" they had extracted and the charges brought against them were convincing Kind of fall.

It must be stated that the circumstances of Kirov's murder have so far harbored many incomprehensible and puzzling questions and require the most thorough investigations. There is evidence to support the view that Kirov's murderer Nikolaev, someone from Kirov's personal protection department helped. Nikolaev was arrested for suspicious behavior a month and a half before the murder, but he was released and not even investigated. Extremely suspicious is the fact that an employee of the ČK, who had been assigned to Kirov, was killed in a "traffic accident" while none of the people accompanying him were injured. After Kirov's assassination, senior officials of the Leningrad NKVD were relieved of their functions and sentenced to very mild sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. One can assume that they were shot to cover the traces of the organizers of the Kirov murder.

The mass reprisals have increased enormously since the end of 1936, after the telegram from Stalin and Ždanovs from Soči from September 25, 1936, that at Kaganovič, Molotov and other members of the Politburo. The content of the telegram was as follows:

"We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent, Gen. Ežov with the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs to entrust. Jagoda was clearly not up to the task in exposing the Trotskyist-Zinov'evist bloc. The OGPU is four years behind schedule on this issue. This is what all party workers and the majority of the NKVD area representatives are talking about. "

Stalin's formulation, according to which the NKVD was "four years behind schedule" in the application of mass reprisals, that the delays should be "made up" quickly, drove the NKVD employees directly onto the path of mass arrests and executions.

It must be noted that this formulation was also imposed on the February / March plenum of the CK of the VKP (b) in 1937. The plenary resolution adopted on the basis of Ežov's speech "The Lessons of Sabotage, Diversion and Espionage by Japanese-German Trotskyist Agents" read:

"The plenary session of the CK of the VKP (b) is of the opinion that all the facts uncovered during the investigation into the question of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center and its supporters on the ground show that the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs has been at least four years away has been belated in exposing these worst enemies of the people. "

The mass repression at that time was carried out under the slogan of the struggle against the Trotskyists. Did the Trotskyists really pose such a threat to our party and the Soviet state at that time? It should be remembered that in 1927, the day before the 15th Congress, for the Trotskyist-Zinov'evist opposition only 4,000 people voted, while 724,000 voted for the party line. During the ten years between the XV. Congress and the February / March plenary session of the CK passed, Trotskyism was completely smashed, many former Trotskyists renounced their earlier views and worked on different phases of socialist construction. It is clear that under the conditions of the victory of socialism there were no grounds for mass terror in the country.

"Stalin's speech at the February / March plenum 1937" On the deficiencies in party work and the measures to liquidate the Trotskyist and other double-faced people " contained an attempt to theoretically justify the policy of mass repression on the pretext that in the course of our progress towards socialism the class struggle supposedly had to intensify more and more. Stalin claimed that both history and Lenin taught this.

In reality, however, Lenin pointed out that the use of revolutionary force was determined by the need to stifle the resistance of the exploiting classes, and these indications from Lenin referred to the period when strong exploiting classes still existed.

It is important to point out that as the political situation in the country improved after Rostov was captured by the Red Army in January 1920 and the victory over Denikin the main thing that had been won was Lenin Dzerzinsky gave instructions to end mass terrorism and lift the death penalty. Lenin justified this important political step by the Soviet power in his report at the meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on February 2, 1920 as follows:

"The terror became us through the terrorism of the Entente imposed when the strongest powers in the world, shrinking from nothing, attacked us with their hordes. We could not have held out for two days had we not met these attempts by officers and White Guards without mercy, and that meant terror, but terror was imposed on us by the terrorist methods of the Entente. But as soon as we had achieved the decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after the capture of Rostov, we renounced the use of the death penalty, thus showing that we stand by our own program as we promised. We declare that the use of force arises from the task of suppressing the exploiters, the landlords and capitalists; when that is done, we will forego all extraordinary measures. We have proven that by the act. "

Stalin departed from these clear and unambiguous programmatic instructions from Lenin. Later, when all the exploiting classes in our country had already been liquidated and there were no serious reasons for the mass use of extraordinary means, of mass terror, Stalin adjusted the party, the organs of the NKVD, to mass terror.

This terror was in fact not directed against the remnants of the broken exploiting classes, but against honest cadres of the party and the Soviet state, against the lying, slanderous and unobjective accusations of "double-faced", "espionage", "sabotage" and the preparation of any imaginary "assassinations" etc. were put forward.

At the February / March plenary session in 1937, many CK members basically doubted the correctness of the course of mass repression, which had been taken under the pretext of the fight against the "double-talkers".

Most clearly expressed these doubts Gen. Postyšev out. He said:

"I understand it this way: Difficult years of struggle have passed, spineless party members broke up or went over to the enemy camp, the healthy elements fought over the cause of the party. Those were the years of industrialization, of collectivization. I would never have imagined can that Karpov and those like him, after going through this difficult period, would end up in the camp of the enemy. The confessions allegedly indicate that Karpov was recruited by the Trotskyists in 1934. Personally, I think that it is unbelievable that in 1934 an honest party member who had gone the long way of bitter struggle against the enemy for the cause of the party, for socialism, should find himself in the camp of the enemy. I do not believe in it ... I cannot imagine that one can go through difficult years with the party and then switch to the Trotskyists in 1934. That's strange ... "

By using Stalin's formulation that the closer one gets to socialism, there will be more and more enemies, and by referring to the resolution of the February / March plenary session on Ežov's speech, provocateurs and unscrupulous careerists began to penetrate the state security organs to camouflage the mass terror against cadres of the party and the Soviet state, against ordinary Soviet citizens with the name of the party. Suffice it to say that the number of those arrested on charges of counterrevolutionary crimes increased more than ten times in 1937 compared to 1936!

It is well known with what brutal arbitrariness was used against leading functionaries of the party. The party statute adopted by the XVII. Party congress was based on Lenin's instructions from the time of the Tenth Party Congress and said that in order to apply an extreme measure such as exclusion from the party against a member of the CK, a candidate of the CK or a member of the party control commission, a plenum of the CK should be used convened and invited to this plenary session "all candidates of the CK and all members of the party control commission". A member or candidate of the CK can only be expelled from the party on the condition that such a general assembly of responsible high party officials with a two-thirds majority deems it necessary.

The majority of the members and candidates of the CK who were elected by the XVII. Party congress and arrested in 1937/1938 were unlawfully expelled from the party, in brutal violation of the party statutes, because the question of their expulsion was not discussed by a CK plenum.

Today, as the cases of some of these alleged "spies" and "vermin" were investigated, it was found that these cases were fabricated. The confession of guilt of many arrested persons charged with hostile activities was achieved through cruel, inhuman torture.

According to members of the then Politburo, Stalin withheld the statements of a number of slandered political functionaries when they withdrew their statements before the military college and asked for an objective investigation into their case. There were quite a few such explanations, and Stalin undoubtedly knew them.

The Central Committee considers it necessary to inform the party congress of many constructed "cases" by members of the CK that took place at the XVII. Congress had been elected.

An example of vicious provocation, disgusting falsification and criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate of the Politburo, a leading party and Soviet state official, the Comrade Ėjche, Member of the party since 1905.

Gen. Ėjche was arrested on April 29, 1938 on the basis of defamatory materials, without the consent of the prosecutor of the USSRwhich was only obtained 15 months after the arrest.

The investigation of the Ėjche case was carried out under conditions of the grossest violation of Soviet legality, arbitrariness and falsifications.

Ėjche was tortured to sign testimony reports prepared by the examining magistrates, in which he and a number of prominent party and Soviet officials were charged with anti-Soviet activity.

On October 1, 1939, Ėjche submitted a statement to Stalin in which he categorically denied his guilt and asked for his case to be investigated. In the statement he wrote:

"There is no greater torture than being in jail in a society that I have always fought for."

A second statement has been received by Ėjche, which he sent to Stalin on October 27, 1939, in which he convincingly, based on facts, overturned the defamatory charges against him and demonstrated that the provocative accusations were, on the one hand, the work of genuine Trotskyists who had agreed to take revenge on him because he had sanctioned their arrest as First Secretary of the West Siberian District Committee of the party, and on the other hand the result of a vicious forgery of the materials by the examining magistrates.

Ėjche wrote in his statement:

"On October 25th this year I was informed that the investigation into my case was complete and was allowed to familiarize myself with the investigative materials. If I was guilty of even a hundredth of one of the crimes I was charged with would be - I would not dare bring you this pre-death statement, but I have not committed any of the crimes of which I have been charged, and there has never been a shadow of wickedness in my heart I said an untrue word to you, and now that I have both feet in the grave, I am not lying to you either.My entire case is a typical example of provocation, slander and violation of the elementary foundations of revolutionary legalism.

... The statements in the investigation files that incriminate me are not only nonsensical, but also contain many points of slander against the CK of the VKP (b) and the Council of People's Commissars. The correct decisions by these bodies, which were not taken either on my initiative or with my participation, are presented as hostile acts of a counter-revolutionary organization which would have been passed on my proposal.

Now I come to the most shameful period of my life ", writes Ėjche," and my really grave guilt towards the party and you. This is my admission of counterrevolutionary activity ... The thing was: I couldn't stand the torture anymore, that Usakov and Nikolaev against me, especially the former, which took advantage of the fact that my vertebrae, which were broken, were healing poorly and causing me excruciating pain. They forced me to slander myself and others.

The majority of my statements were instilled or dictated with by Ušakov. The remainder I recalled from memory from the materials of the NKVD of Western Siberia, attributing all the facts cited in the NKVD materials to myself. If something was not quite right in the reading fabricated by Ušakov and signed by me, I was forced to sign another variant. So it was in the case Ruchimovič, which one initially for Reserve center calculated what was later deleted - without telling me - the same applied to the chairman of the reserve center allegedly created by Bukharin in 1935. First I put my name in, later I was told that of Mežlauk and there have been many similar occurrences ...

... I beg you and implore you to instruct that my case be re-examined, not to spare me but to expose the worthless provocation that has wrapped around many people like a snake, especially because of my despondency and the criminal ones Accusation. I never betrayed you or the party. I know that I will perish as a result of the unworthy, vile activities of enemies of the Party and the people who have prepared a provocation against me. "

It should have been said that such an important statement should have been discussed by the CK. But that did not happen, the declaration was sent to Beria, and the cruel settlement with the slandered Politburo candidate Gen. Ėjche continued.

On February 2, 1940, Gen. Ėjche was on trial. In the courtroom, Gen. Ėjche did not confess his guilt and stated the following:

"In all of my alleged statements there is not a single letter from myself, with the exception of the signatures under the protocols that I was forced to enter. I made these statements under pressure from the examining magistrate, who mistreated me from the beginning of my arrest I began to write all sorts of stupid things ... The main thing for me, the court, the party and Stalin is to tell that I am not guilty. I have never been involved in a conspiracy. I die with the same belief in the correctness of the policy of the Party as I have believed in her throughout all of my work. "

Ėjche was shot dead on February 4th. Today it is indisputably certain that the Ėjche case was fabricated.

The candidate of the Politburo Gen. Rudzutak, A member of the party since 1905, who had spent 10 years in the tsar's penitentiary, returned his forced statements in court. The minutes of the Military College of the Supreme Court contains the following statement by Rudzutak:

"... The only request he has of the court is to inform the CK of the VKP (b) that there is a not yet liquidated center in the organs of the NKVD that artificially constructs cases and that are completely innocent Forcing people to plead guilty; that there is no way of investigating the circumstances of the prosecution and that there is no way at all to prove one's own failure to participate in the crimes referred to in this or that testimony of various people Investigative methods are such that they compel completely innocent people to lie and slander not to mention the defendant himself. He asks the court to enable him to write all this to the CK of the VKP (b). He assures us the court that he personally never had any bad intentions towards the politics of our party, because he always agrees with the party politics in all areas of economic and cultural construction te. "

This declaration by Rudzutak was ignored, even though he was known to have been chairman of the Central Party Control Commission, which was created in accordance with Lenin's conception of the struggle for party unity. Thus the chairman of such an important party organ fell victim to brutal arbitrariness: he was not even called to the Politburo, and Stalin did not want to speak to him. He was sentenced and shot within 20 minutes.

After a thorough investigation into the case in 1955, it was determined that the charges against Rudzutaks were fabricated and that he had been convicted on the basis of defamatory materials. Rudzutaks was rehabilitated posthumously.

The way in which NKVD employees at the time artificially constructed various "anti-Soviet centers" and "blocks" using provocative methods is evident from the statements made by the gene. Rozenbljum member since 1906, arrested by the Leningrad branch of the NKVD in 1937.

While reviewing the case Komarov In 1955, the former examining magistrate of the NKVD, Rozenbljum reported the following incident: When he, Rozenbljum, was arrested in 1937, he was subjected to cruel torture, during which he was forced to make false statements about himself and others , He was then moved to the office of Zakovsky who offered him his release on condition that he fabricated false statements in the 1937 from the NKVD in court "Case of the Leningrad Sabotage, Terror, Diversion and Espionage Center" make. With incredible cynicism, Zakovsky revealed the repulsive "mechanism" for the artificial creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet conspiracies".

"To illustrate this to me," explained Rozenbljum, "Zakovskij presented me with some variants of possible schemes of this center and its branches ...

After introducing me to these schemes, Zakovsky said that the NKVD was preparing the case for this center, indicating that the trial would be public.

The top management of the center, four to five people, should be brought to court: Čudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Šapošnikova and others, as well as 2-3 people from each branch ...

... The case of the Leningrad Center should be dealt with solidly, and in this the witnesses would be crucial. The social position (of course in the past) and the length of time the witness belonged to a party play no small role.

"You," said Zakovskij, "will not have to invent anything. The NKVD will prepare a ready-made template for you for each branch. It is your job to memorize all of the questions that can be asked by the court and the answers to them The case will be prepared over the course of four to five months, maybe even within six months. During this time you will prepare yourself so as not to compromise the investigation and yourself. The course and outcome of the process will be Your future fate will depend. If you fail and start talking nonsense, blame yourself. If you hold out, you will save your head and we will entertain and clothe you until death at the expense of the state. "

The fabrication of criminal proceedings on site was carried out on an even broader scale. The Sverdlovsk Oblast NKVD administration "discovered" the so-called "Uprising staff of the Urals region - organ of a bloc of right-wing, Trotskyists, Social Revolutionaries and church people" - at the head of which allegedly the secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the party, member of the CK of the VKP (b) Kabakov who had belonged to the party since 1914. From the research materials of this time it emerges that in almost all regions, areas and republics there are widely ramified "right Trotskyist espionage and terror, diversion and pest organizations and centers" and that at the head of these "organizations" and "centers" are usually - unknown why - the First secretaries of the area and county committees or the Central Committees of the CPs of the national republics would have stood.

Many thousands of honest, innocent communists have died as a result of this egregious falsification of such "cases", as a result of the belief in various slanderous "statements" as well as forced self-accusations and denigrations of others. In the same way, the "cases" of such prominent party and state officials as Kosior, Čubar ', Postyšev, Kosarev and other fabricated.

During these years unjustified mass reprisals have been used, as a result of which the party has suffered great losses from its cadres.

The criminal practice had become naturalized in the NKVD Lists of those persons for whose cases the military college was responsible and for whom the sentence was determined in advance.

Ežov personally forwarded these lists to Stalin so that he could confirm the proposed penalties. In the years 1937/1938, 383 such lists were sent to Stalin, containing the names of many thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol-, military and economic functionaries and who found his approval.

A significant part of these proceedings is currently under review and a large number of them are being discontinued as unfounded and falsified. Suffice it to say that since 1954 to date the Supreme Court Military College has rehabilitated 7,679 individuals, many of whom have been posthumously rehabilitated.

The mass arrests of party, Soviet, economic and military functionaries have inflicted enormous damage on our country and the cause of socialist construction.

The mass repressions had an unfavorable influence on the political and moral state of the party, created insecurity, contributed to the spread of sick suspicion, and sowed mutual distrust between the communists. Defamers and careerists of all kinds were given a boost.

The resolutions of the January plenary session of the CK of the VKP (b) in 1938 brought about a certain recovery of the party organizations. But the broad-based reprisals continued in 1938 as well.

And only because our party has great moral and political strength was it able to cope with the difficult events of 1937/1938, survive these events and attract new cadres. But there is no doubt that our advance towards socialism and the preparation for the defense of the country would have been much more successful had it not been for the huge casualties we suffered as a result of the massive, unfounded and unjustified reprisals of 1937 / Suffered in 1938.

We quite rightly accuse Ežov of using degenerate practices in 1937. But one must also answer such questions: Could Ežov arrest Kosior, for example, without Stalin's knowledge? Has there been an exchange of views or a decision by the Politburo on this matter? No, it did not exist, just as it did not exist in other such cases. Was Ežov able to decide on such important questions as the fate of outstanding party officials? No, it would be naive to consider this to be Ežov's work alone. It is clear that Stalin decided on such things that without his instructions, without his consent, Ežov could not have done anything.

We have now investigated the Kosior, Rudzutak, Postyšev, Kosarev and others cases and rehabilitated these comrades. On what basis had she been arrested and sentenced? The examination of the documents showed that there was no basis for this. Like many others, she was arrested without the consent of the prosecutor. Under these conditions, no consent was required; what approval could there still be if Stalin decided everything? He was the chief prosecutor on these matters. Stalin not only gave permission, he even gave instructions for arrests on his own initiative. This has to be said so that everything is clear to the party congress delegates so that they can judge it correctly and draw appropriate conclusions.

The facts show that many abuses took place on the orders of Stalin, without observing any norms of party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very suspicious person with pathological suspicion, of which we who worked with him could convince ourselves. He could look at someone and say, "Why do you have such a troubled look today?" or: "Why do you turn around so often today and not look me straight in the eye?" The pathological suspicion aroused indiscriminate suspicion in him, including in relation to prominent party officials whom he had known for many years. Everywhere, at every turn, he saw "enemies", "double-talkers" and "spies".

In possession of unlimited power, he tolerated cruel arbitrariness, he morally and physically oppressed people. Such a situation arose in which man could not express his own will.

If Stalin said that someone was to be arrested, one had to believe that this was an "enemy of the people". And the Beria gang, which had power in the state security organs, left no stone unturned to prove the guilt of the arrested persons and the conclusiveness of the materials they manufactured. And what evidence has been presented? The confession of the arrested. And the examining magistrates produced these "confessions". But how can you get a person to confess to a crime he has never committed? Only in one way - using physical methods of manipulation, torture, deprivation of consciousness, intellect, human dignity. This is how the "confessions" were obtained.

When the wave of mass reprisals began to subside in 1939, when the leaders of territorial party organizations began to accuse employees of the NKVD of using physical methods of action against arrested persons, on January 10, 1939, Stalin sent an encrypted telegram to the secretaries of the area and district committees, to the central committees of the national CPs, to the People's Commissars for Internal Affairs and the heads of the NKVD administrations. The telegram read:

"The CK of the VKP (b) declares that the use of physical influence in the practice of the NKVD has been permitted since 1937 with the permission of the CK of the VKP (b) ... It is known that all bourgeois secret services physical influence against the representatives of the socialist The question arises why a socialist secret service should be more humane against bitter agents of the bourgeoisie, against mortal enemies of the working class and the collective farms. The CK of the VKP (b) is of the opinion that the The method of physical action should continue to be used as a completely correct and expedient method against open and unwilling enemies of the people. "

Thus, the most brutal violation of socialist legality, the torture, the torment, which - as already stated - led to the defamation and self-denaturation of innocent people, were sanctioned by Stalin on behalf of the CK of the VKP (b).

Recently, just a few days before the current party conference, we have the examining magistrate Rodos, who at the time led the investigation and interrogation in the case of Kosior, Čubar 'and Kosarev, was invited to a meeting of the CK Presidium and questioned. He's a miserable man with a sparrow-brain, morally literally a freak. And such a person decided the fate of outstanding party functionaries, also decided the politics in these questions, since by proving their "criminality" they at the same time provided material for serious political conclusions.

The question arises whether such a person could have come up with conducting the investigation in such a way as to prove the guilt of people like Kosior and others. No, he could not do that without the appropriate instructions.At the meeting of the Presidium of the CK he explained to us the following: "I was told that Kosior and Čubar 'are enemies of the people, so as an examining magistrate I had to get them to confess that they are enemies."

He could only get there through prolonged torture, which he did, with detailed instructions from Beria. It must be said that Rodos said cynically at the meeting of the CK presidium: "I believed that I was carrying out the instructions of the party." This is how Stalin's instruction on the use of methods of physical action on the arrested was carried out.

These and many other facts show that all norms of the appropriate, partisan solution to problems have been eliminated, that everything has been subordinated to the will of a single person.


The sole rule of Stalin led to particularly serious consequences in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

If one takes our numerous historical novels, films and historical "scientific studies", then the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War is in no way portrayed truthfully. Usually one draws the following scheme: Stalin foresaw everything. The Soviet Army pursued the tactic of "active defense", a tactic which, as is well known, brought the Germans as far as Moscow and Stalingrad, based on the strategic plan which Stalin had, they would almost say, prophetically developed in advance. Using this tactic, the Soviet Army allegedly took the offensive and crushed the enemy thanks to Stalin's ingenuity. The epochal victory that was won by the armed forces of the Soviet country, by our heroic people, is thus completely attributed to Stalin's strategic ingenuity in the novels, films and "scientific studies".

One must carefully analyze this question because it is not only of great historical importance, but above all of political, educational and practical importance.

What are the facts like on this matter?

Before the war, there was a boastful tone in our press and in all educational work: when the enemy invades the holy Soviet earth, we respond to the enemy's thrust with a triple thrust. We will carry the war into enemy territory and win it with little casualty. But these bold declarations were by no means supported in all areas by concrete precautions that would actually have guaranteed the inviolability of our borders.

During and after the war, Stalin advanced the thesis that the tragedy our people experienced in the first period of the war was supposedly the result of the "unexpected" attack by the Germans on the Soviet Union. But, comrades, that does not correspond to reality at all. Hitler Immediately after the takeover of power in Germany, the goal of crushing communism emerged. The fascists talked about it openly and did not hide their plans. Various pacts, blocks and axes, such as the notorious, were crafted to achieve these aggressive goals Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. Numerous facts from the pre-war period clearly show that Hitler directed all efforts to unleash the war against the Soviet state and that he concentrated huge military units, including tank units, near the Soviet borders.

From the documents published today it appears that Churchill as early as April 3, 1941 through the mediation of the British Ambassador to the USSR, Cripps, Stalin personally warned that the German troops had begun a new relocation and were preparing to invade the Soviet Union. Churchill stated in his letter that he asked "to warn Stalin and to make him aware of the impending danger". Churchill emphasized this also in his telegrams of April 18 and on the following days. However, Stalin did not take these warnings into account. Moreover, Stalin instructed that such information should not be believed in order to allegedly not provoke military action.

It should be noted that such information about the impending danger of German troops invading the territory of the Soviet Union also reached our military and diplomatic missions. But because the leadership was prejudiced against such information from the outset, it was always formulated with appropriate reservations.

For example, shared the military and naval attaché in Berlin, captain Voroncov, in a telegram dated May 6, 1941: "The Soviet citizen Bozer ... informed our deputy naval attaché that, according to the words of an officer from Hitler's headquarters, the Germans were to attack the USSR via Finland, the Baltic countries, on May 14 and Latvia. At the same time, major air raids are to be flown against Moscow and Leningrad, and parachute landings are to be carried out in border towns ... "

In his report of May 22, 1941, the deputy military attaché in Berlin said Chlopov, with that "... the attack by the German troops was supposedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it will begin in the first few days of June ..."

In a telegram from our embassy in London on June 18, 1941, it was reported: "As for the present moment, Cripps is firmly convinced that the armed clash between Germany and the USSR is inevitable, and not later than mid-June According to Cripps, to this day the Germans have concentrated 147 divisions (including air forces and auxiliary troops) on the Soviet borders ... "

Despite these unusually serious signals, insufficient measures have been taken to prepare the country well for defense and to rule out the element of surprise.

Did we have time and opportunities for such preparations? Yes, we had the time and the opportunities. Our industry was already at such a level that it could supply the Soviet Army with whatever it needed. This is confirmed by the fact that the Soviet people, after we had lost almost half of our entire industry in the course of the war because of the occupation of the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the western regions of the country, important industrial and grain areas by the enemy, in the We were able to organize the production of military equipment in the eastern areas of the country, to put the equipment transported there from the western industrial districts into operation and to supply our armed forces with everything that was needed to destroy the enemy.

If our industry had been mobilized in good time and sufficiently to supply the army with weapons and necessary equipment, we would have suffered immeasurably fewer casualties in this war. However, such mobilization was not carried out in time. And already in the first days of the war it became clear that our army was poorly equipped, that it did not have enough artillery, tanks and aircraft to defend itself against the enemy.

Soviet science and technology had developed excellent types of tanks and artillery before the war. But no mass production was organized for any of this, and it was practically only on the eve of the war that we started modernizing army equipment. As a result, at the time the enemy attacked Soviet territory, we had neither sufficient quantities of old equipment, which we had taken out of the equipment, nor of new equipment which we were only planning to introduce. The situation with anti-aircraft guns was very poor, and the production of anti-tank ammunition had not been organized. Many fortified areas turned out to be unprotected at the moment of the attack because the old weapons were withdrawn from them and new ones were not yet available.

Unfortunately, this was not just true of tanks, artillery, and planes. When the war broke out, we did not even have a sufficient number of rifles to arm those who were called up. I remember being in Kiev in those days Malenkov called and told him:

"People join the army and ask for weapons. Send us weapons."

Then Malenkov said to me: "We cannot send weapons. We have sent all the carbines to Leningrad. You have to arm yourself."

That was the case with the armament.

One cannot help but recall the following fact in connection with this. He wrote shortly before the attack by Hitler's troops on the Soviet Union Kirponos (he later died on the front) to Stalin, that the German armies had advanced to the bow, reinforced everything for those prepared to attack, and would most likely go over to the offensive in a short time. In connection with this, Kirponos proposed the creation of a reliable defense, the evacuation of 300,000 people from the border areas and the construction of several powerful fortified rooms: the construction of anti-tank trenches, the construction of shelters for the soldiers, etc.

Moscow replied to this proposal that it was a provocation, that no preparatory measures should be carried out at the border, and that the Germans should not be given an excuse to start acts of war against us. Thus our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.

When the fascist troops had already invaded Soviet territory and the hostilities had begun, the order came from Moscow not to answer the shots. Why? Because, contrary to the obvious facts, Stalin said that this was not yet the war, but a provocation of individual undisciplined units of the German army, and if we answered the Germans, that would serve as the reason for the start of the war.

The following fact is also known. On the day before the attack by the Hitler army on the territory of the Soviet Union, a German crossed our border and announced that the German troops had received orders to begin the offensive against the Soviet Union on June 22nd at 3 a.m. Stalin was immediately informed of this, but this signal was also ignored.

As you can see, everything was ignored: both the warning of individual military commanders and the testimony of defectors from the enemy army and even the open actions of the enemy. Is that the insight of the party and country leader at such a responsible historical moment?