Why are Somalis very entrepreneurial

TE Bvwg knowledge 2019/6/5 W252 2181683-1

I. Procedure:

1. The complainant, a male citizen of Somalia, applied for international protection in Austria on April 14, 2016.

2. The first questioning of the complainant took place on the same day in front of an organ of the public security service. When asked about his reasons for fleeing, the complainant stated that he had left his home country because of an act of revenge against him. His brother had killed another man and his family now wanted to kill the applicant. This family forced the applicant's parents to extradite the applicant.

3. As doubts arose about the applicant's minority during an appointment at the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (hereinafter: Federal Office) on April 21, 2016, his bone age was determined by an X-ray of his left hand on April 27, 2016. On May 30, 2016, the Federal Office issued the order to obtain a medical expert opinion to determine the age.

The expert report of July 14, 2016 showed that the minimum age was 19 at the time of the investigation on June 17, 2016, which is why it could be assumed that the complainant was at least 18 years old at the time of his asylum application.

4. With the procedural order of November 7, 2016, based on the medical report of June 17, 2016, the complainant was of legal age and set as the date of birth for the minimum age of XXXX.

5. The request for admission made by the Federal Office to the Italian authorities on 04.07.2016 in accordance with Art. 13 (1) Dublin III Regulation was rejected by them with a letter of 21.07.2016 on the grounds that the complainant was not known to the Italian authorities, and moreover, there is no evidence of his stay in Italy.

6. In a pleading dated August 17, 2017, the complainant, represented by the legal representative named in the ruling, filed a default complaint due to a violation of the duty to make a decision. On January 3rd, 2018, ed. arrived on January 4th, 2018, the Federal Office submitted the administrative act.

7. The Federal Administrative Court commissioned the Federal Office on January 5, 2018, in accordance with Section 19 (6) AsylG 2005, to interrogate the complainant.

On March 1, 2018, the complainant was questioned in writing before the Federal Office on the application for international protection. The complainant essentially alleged that his brother had killed someone and that the family had been attacked at home one evening at the end of January 2015. People wanted to kill the complainant. The complainant then ran away and first came to Ambarayso and then to Ethiopia in March 2015.

8. On January 11, 2019, the Federal Administrative Court held a public hearing in the presence of a Somali language interpreter and the complainant's legal representative, in which the complainant asked in detail about his personal circumstances in his country of origin, his reasons for fleeing and his integration in Austria has been. In the course of the negotiation, the complainant presented a bundle of integration documents. The complainant was given the current country information sheet of the state documentation on Somalia of January 12th, 2018, the ACCORD report "Country of origin, humanitarian aid, labor market, supply situation in Mogadishu" of May 11th, 2016, as well as the response to the state documentation "Somalia / Somaliland: legal system: negligent homicide, Discrimination "from 04/05/2018, held for comment. A representative of the Federal Office did not take part in the negotiation. The negotiating document was sent to the Federal Office.

9. With the knowledge of April 8, 2019 or the correction decision of May 8, 2019, the complainant's application was rejected as unfounded. No decision was taken on a residence permit for reasons worthy of consideration in accordance with Section 57 AsylG 2005 and a return decision in accordance with Section 52 (2) no.2 FPG.

II. The Federal Administrative Court has considered:

1. Findings:

1.1. About the complainant:

The applicant of legal age at the time of the application for asylum bears the name XXXX and the (fictitious) date of birth XXXX. He is a Somali national, a member of the Sheikhal clan, Lobogi subclan, Fiqi Cumar subclan, and is a Muslim.

The applicant was born in Baraawe, Lower Shabelle Province, and lived there with his parents and siblings in a family owned house. He is single, has no children and attended school in his country of origin from 2008 to 2012. It cannot be established that the complainant was not employed in Somalia. The family's livelihood was secured by the brother's employment in a cafeteria.

The applicant's family (his parents, a sister and two brothers) still live in the applicant's hometown (Baraawe). In addition, uncles on the maternal and paternal side still live in the applicant's country of origin. Another sister of the complainant lives in Germany.

The applicant would not find himself in a life-threatening or life-threatening situation if he returned to his hometown of Baraawe, Province of Lower Shabelle.

1.2. Regarding the complainant's reasons for fleeing:

The allegation made by the complainant to escape cannot be established:

1.2.1. The applicant is not exposed to any asylum-related persecution by private individuals in Somalia due to the fact that his brother killed a man.

1.3. On the (private) life of the complainant in Austria:

Since his application on April 14, 2016, the complainant has been legally resident throughout due to a temporary residence permit according to the AsylG and has consistently received benefits from the basic care. To date, he has not pursued any professional activity in Germany.

He completed the ÖSD certificate at level A1 and A2 and attended the values ​​and orientation course of the ÖIF.

He is currently attending the "Transitional Level" course at the Bundesrealgymnasium Linz, which lasts from November 12, 2018 to June 28, 2019. In his spare time he plays with his friends.

The complainant has no family ties in the federal territory.

The complainant does not suffer from any serious or life-threatening illnesses, he is healthy.

He is criminally harmless in the federal territory.

1.4. Regarding the relevant situation in Somalia:

In the following, the main findings from the country information sheet of the state documentation relating to Somalia dated January 12, 2018 (last brief information inserted on September 17, 2018) are reproduced. The Federal Administrative Court brought the reports and information into the proceedings and made them available to the parties to ensure that the parties were heard during the proceedings.

Security situation

The power of the government of the SWS hardly extends beyond Baidoa. In many places in Bay and Bakool that are not controlled by al Shabaab, there are only rudimentary administrations, which have often been organized by Ethiopia. The al Shabaab controls many road connections and rural areas (BFA 8.2017). In December 2017, the SWS started to set up district councils for Baidoa, Baraawe and Berdale. The district council for Xudur had already been set up in October, and a mayor was also appointed (UNAMIS December 20, 2017).

With international support, the government has succeeded in building its own small army, the South West State Special Police Force (SWSSPF) (BFA 8.2017).

Al Shabaab reclaimed some areas in the Shabelle Valley in 2017, including the city of Bariire. Government forces withdrew from there in protest against arrears in the payment of wages (ICG October 20, 2017). The Merka, Qoryooley and Afgooye districts are particularly hard hit by the violence (DIS 3.2017). On the one hand, the Afgooye-Mogadishu-Merka triangle forms the operational heavyweight of al Shabaab (BFA 8.2017). On the other hand, the violence in the area is more marked by clan clashes than by al Shabaab (DIS 3.2017). The three main actors in the triangle are therefore AMISOM, militias and al Shabaab. Attacks and attacks often occur in and around Afgooye (BFA 8.2017). Although Afgooye is controlled by AMISOM (DIS 3.2017), al Shabaab has already invaded the city several times and has regularly thrown the SNA back there. Al Shabaab has withdrawn from Afgooye just as regularly. Al Shabaab has not yet indicated that they want to keep the city occupied for longer or take up the fight with the AMISOM stationed there (BFA 8.2017).

Qoryooley is controlled by AMISOM (DIS 3.2017), but the area is endangered. At the same time there are clan conflicts in this area, especially between Habr Gedir, Biyomaal and Rahanweyn. The fertility of the area is one of the reasons for the density of violence. There are often arguments about resources; and many clans are involved. Al Shabaab and AMISOM take sides in such conflicts (BFA 8.2017).

Clan clashes in Lower Shabelle, in which Habr Gedir, Biyomaal and Digil are primarily involved, have been going on since 2014. After the short-term takeover of Merka by al Shabaab in February 2016, in which the Habr Gedir militias and elements of the Somali army had apparently sided with the Islamists, the Biyomaal allied with AMISOM. In contrast, networks of the Habr Gedir have sided with the al Shabaab (SEMG November 8, 2017).

As a result, al Shabaab began burning and looting Biyomaal villages as early as October 2016 (SEMG November 8, 2017); A total of 28 civilians were killed in the fighting between Habr Gedir and Biyomaal in Lower Shabelle in 2016 (USDOS 3/3/2017). The situation escalated in May 2017 (SEMG November 8, 2017) when at least eighteen villages between Merka and Afgooye houses were burned by Biyomaal and numerous people were displaced. In addition, dozens of people were kidnapped and held in a makeshift camp in Mubarak (HRW July 26, 2017). In 2017, al Shabaab took action against the Biyomaal. Entire village populations were expelled from the area between Merka and Afgooye (BFA 8.2017). In August 2017, there was a dispute over the city of Merka between the Biyomaal militias on the one hand and the Habr Gedir and al Shabaab militias on the other (SEMG November 8, 2017).

Merka was captured by AMISOM in 2013, but the presence of al Shabaab in the surrounding area is large and the group has repeatedly been able to penetrate Merka (DIS 3.2017). At the moment the situation of Merka is very confused and subject to change (BFA 8.2017). In autumn 2016, AMISOM vacated the positions in the city. However, there is still an AMISOM base in the immediate periphery of Merka (DIS 3.2017; cf. BFA 8.2017). The Ugandan troops stationed there also undertake sporadic patrols into the city. Merka has a functioning administration and a District Commissioner appointed by the SWS. The city administration operates a city police and a police station. On the other hand, there are no SNA forces in the city (BFA 8.2017). It can be attested that neither AMISOM nor al Shabaab control the city (BFA 8.2017; cf. DIS 3.2017). Local militias (Biyomaal and Habr Gedir) play an important role (BFA 8.2017). It is unclear who effectively controls the city (DIS 3.2017)

There have been no reports of relevant battles from the city of Baraawe for months. The city seems to be quiet, there is an AMISOM base. Major SNA forces are stationed at the Bali Doogle base, including the Danaab special unit. There is also a US training base and a drone deployment base there (BFA 8.2017). Sablaale and Kurtunwaarey are controlled by al Shabaab (DIS 3.2017).

Al Shabaab continues to control large areas of Bay and Bakool. The group also operates at least three training camps there (SEMG November 8, 2017).

The security situation in Baidoa has improved in recent months. The city is described as being relatively safe. There are regular security operations and raids by security forces. The operational capability of the SWS Police Force (SWSPF) has improved after the admission of local recruits. At the same time, Baidoa is dependent on the presence of the Ethiopian AMISOM troops. Al Shabaab seems to be able to infiltrate Baidoa at night (BFA 8.2017).

SWSPF police officers are also stationed in Qansax Dheere and Bakool. The SWS Special Police Force (SWSSPF) has bases in Baidoa, Buur Hakaba and Goof Gaduud. Anti-al-Shabaab forces in the Bay region have bases in Berdale, Baidoa, Buur Hakaba, Awdiinle, Leego, Qansax Dheere and Bush Madina (BFA 8.2017). The town of Leego was taken by al Shabaab at the beginning of August after AMISOM had withdrawn from there (JF August 15, 2017).

Al Shabaab is relatively active in the Bay region, with its main focus east of the connecting road from Baidoa to Waajid. With the exception of the garrison towns mentioned, the Islamists generally control the entire Bay region. Government influence and control end just a few kilometers outside of Baidoa (BFA 8.2017).

The SWS administration has installed a governor for Bakool, but he only has influence in Xudur. There is also a larger SNA base in Xudur. An approx. 20 km wide border strip on the border with Ethiopia is described as free from al Shabaab. The Ethiopian Liyu Police are also active there. Independent clan militias also operate here. Overall, the Bakool administration faces massive problems in reaching the population. Al Shabaab controls large parts of the region (BFA 8.2017).

Anti-al-Shabaab forces in the Bakool region have bases in Yeed, Rab Dhuure, Garas Weyne, Buur Dhuxunle, Xudur, Waajid, Abeesale, Ato and Ceel Barde (BFA 8.2017).

According to an estimate in 2014, around 2.36 million people lived in the regions of Bakool, Bay and Lower Shabelle (UNFPA 10/2014). In comparison, the ACLED database reported a total of 100 incidents in 2016 in which civilians were deliberately killed (category "violence against civilians"). One civilian was killed in each of 64 of these 100 incidents. In 2017 there were 116 such incidents (70 of them with one death each). The number of incidents with fatalities (mostly one fatality) in the regions of Bakool, Bay and Lower Shabelle has developed as follows in recent years (it must be taken into account that depending on the control situation and information basis, over- or under-reporting can occur ; the death toll is not taken into account due to the approx. 50% inaccuracy of ACLED).

Minorities / clans

The Somali and the Punjabi constitution are committed to the principle of non-discrimination (AA 1.1.2017). However, the government and parliament were along the so-called for a long time

"4.5 Solution" is organized, which means that the representatives of the large clans are entitled to the same number of parliamentary seats, while smaller clans and minority groups are jointly entitled to half of these seats (ÖB 9.2016; cf. USDOS 3.3.2017). So the clans remained the determining factor in Somali and Somaliland politics. No state can be built against or without them. Accordingly, political parties, local administrations and also the national parliament are organized around the various clans or sub-clans, with the four largest clans (Darood, Hawiye, Dir-Isaaq and Digil-Mirifle) dominating administration, politics and society. Overall, it has so far not contributed to any progress in ethnic or clan-related equality, nor has it had positive effects on coexistence at community level (ÖB 9.2016). In political, social and economic matters, clan membership is still important, which can marginalize minorities and IDPs (SEM May 31, 2017).

The minorities are represented in the Somali parliament and the Somali government, but their vote has little weight. Neither the traditional right to xeer nor the police and the judiciary systematically discriminate against the minorities. However, factors such as financial strength, level of education or the size of a group can make it difficult for minorities to access justice. (SEM May 31, 2017). Many minority communities live in deep poverty and suffer from numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion (USDOS 3/3/2017). Individual minorities (including Jareer, Benadiri, Gabooye) live under particularly difficult social conditions and in many ways see themselves economically, politically and socially excluded from the rest of the population - but not systematically from government agencies (AA 1.1.2017).

Minority communities are disproportionately affected by the violence prevailing in the country (killings, torture, rape, etc.) (USDOS 3.3.2017).

Groups like the Rahanweyn, the Bantu or the Madhiban can only count on remittances from relatives in the diaspora to a lesser extent, as there are relatively few Rahanweyn and Bantu in the diaspora (SEMG November 8, 2017).

With al Shabaab, the general rule is that those clans that are considered to be directed against al Shabaab have to reckon with more problems - be it e.g. higher taxation; economic isolation; or looting (EASO 8/2014).

Population structure

More than 85% of the population share an ethnic origin (USDOS 3/3/2017). Another source says that, according to an estimate from 2002, the minorities together make up about a third of the population of Somalia (ÖB 9.2016). In any case, there is a fragmentation in the whole of Somalia into numerous clans, subclans and sub-subclans, whose membership is determined by family relationships or traditional feelings of belonging (AA 1.1.2017; cf. ÖB 9.2016, SEM 31.5.2017). This subdivision continues down to the nuclear family (SEM May 31, 2017).

Belonging to a clan is the most important identity-forming factor for Somalis. It determines where someone lives, works and is protected (SEM May 31, 2017). This identifier determines which position a person or group takes in political discourse or in armed conflict (AA 4.2017a). That is why Somalis usually know their exact position in the clan system (SEM May 31, 2017). However, there are no physical characteristics that indicate belonging to a particular clan. Therefore, the people in Mogadishu and other large cities do not automatically know which clan a person belongs to (LI 04/04/2016).

The so-called "noble" clan families can trace their descent to a mythical common ancestor named Hiil or his sons Samaale and Saab, who are said to be descended from the Prophet Mohammed. Most minorities, however, cannot claim such ancestry (SEM May 31, 2017).

So the Somalis see themselves as a nation of Arab descent. The "noble" clan families are mostly nomads:


The Darod are divided into the three main groups Ogaden, Marehan and Harti as well as some smaller clans. The Harti are a federation of three clans: the Majerteen are the most important clan of Puntland, while the Dulbahante and Warsangeli live in the disputed border regions between Somaliland and Puntland. The Ogaden are the most important Somali clan in Ethiopia, but they also have great influence in the southern Somali Jubba regions and in northeastern Kenya. The Marehan are present in southern / central Somalia.


The Hawiye live mainly in southern / central Somalia. The most important Hawiye clans are the Habr Gedir and the Abgaal, both of whom have great influence in and around Mogadishu.


The Dir live in western Somaliland as well as in the neighboring areas in Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well as in smaller areas of southern / central Somalia. The most important Dir clans are the Issa, Gadabursi (both in the north) and Biyomaal (southern / central Somalia).


The Isaaq are the most important clan family in Somaliland, where they live compactly. Some of them are counted among you.


The Rahanweyn or Digil / Mirifle are seen as another clan family. They are considered to be descendants of Saab, Samaale's brother (SEM May 31, 2017; see AA 4.2017a).

It is not possible to give the exact numerical proportions of the individual clans. Hawiye, Darod, Isaaq and Digil / Mirifle each make up 20-25% of the total population, which you significantly less (AA 4.2017a).

All majority clans and some of the ethnic minorities - but not the professional groups - have their own territory. Its expansion can change due to conflicts (SEM May 31, 2017).

Minorities are those groups that are weaker than the "noble" majority clans due to their smaller number. These include groups with non-Somali ethnic origins;

Groups traditionally involved in occupations that have traditionally been viewed as impure;

as well as the members of "noble" clans who do not live on the territory of their clan or who are small in number (SEM May 31, 2017).

Ethnic minorities, current situation

Ethnic minorities have a different ancestry and in some cases a different language than the rest of the Somali-speaking population. There is no reliable information about their number. Estimates range between 6% and a third of the population of Somalia. The most important ethnic minorities are (SEM May 31, 2017):


The Bantu: They are the largest minority in Somalia. Traditionally, they live as sedentary farmers in the fertile valleys of the Jubba and Shabelle rivers. There are numerous Bantu groups or clans, such as Gosha, Makane, Kabole, Shiidle, Reer Shabelle, Mushunguli, Oji or Gobaweyne; Pejoratively they are also called Adoon (slaves) or Jareer (curly hair) (SEM May 31, 2017).


The Benadiri: "Benadiri" is an umbrella term for various independent urban minorities who live in the coastal cities of the south such as Mogadishu, Merka or Baraawe. The Benadiri groups traditionally deal with trade. They are of mixed ancestry from Somalia, Arabia (Oman), Persia, India, and Portugal. Before 1991, they had privileged status. Without an armed militia, however, they were defenseless in the civil war (SEM May 31, 2017).


The Bajuni: They are a small fishing people who live on the Bajuni Islands at the southern tip of Somalia and in Kismayo (SEM May 31, 2017).

The social position of the ethnic minorities is different. The Benadiri are generally respected as traders (SEM May 31, 2017). The existence of a dynamic economic community of the Benadiri has been proven (UKUT November 5, 2015). You have managed to fill positions in administration. In addition, most of the Benadiri merchants who remained in Mogadishu are relatively wealthy and can buy protection (EASO 8/2014). Benadiri can turn to this community in search of a livelihood (UKUT November 5, 2015).

On the other hand, most Somali look down on the sedentary Bantu, some of whom had once come to the country as slaves (SEM May 31, 2017). The Bantu are discriminated against because of their ethnicity (UNHRC October 28, 2015). But there are also higher-ranking Bantu, e.g. Brigadier General Mohamud Haji Ahmed Ali "Shegow" (SEMG November 8, 2017).

The conflict between the Bantu group of the Shiidle and the Hawiye / Abgal has repeatedly led to armed clashes in the past. In November 2013, around 5,000 Shiidle were expelled from twenty villages northeast of Jowhar (Middle Shabelle) (SEMG November 8, 2017; see AA 1.1.2017). In April 2017, after fighting between militias of the Hawiye / Abgal / Wacbudan / Eli and the Jareer / Shiidle / Bare, more than 5,000 Jareers were again expelled from three villages near Balcad. Abgal militias and some supportive elements of the Somali army were responsible for this. There are few reports of physical harm to civilians; however, the villages were looted and some of them burned down. Most of the people fled near the AMISOM base in Balcad (SEMG November 8, 2017). In August 2017, a new district administration was appointed for Balcad; local clans are now better represented. The new administration has announced tough measures against the conflicting parties should further acts of violence occur; so far the threat seems to be working (SEMG November 8, 2017).

Since ethnic minorities see themselves disadvantaged by the clan-based power-sharing in the government, al Shabaab tries to use this for their own purposes and to solicit support there (UNSOM September 18, 2017). In areas from which al Shabaab has withdrawn, there could be reprisals against individual minority members if they had supported al Shabaab (SEM May 31, 2017; cf. EASO 8/2014).

Professional minorities, current situation

Professional groups do not differ from the majority population in terms of ethnicity, language and culture. Unlike the "noble" clans, they are said to be unable to trace their lineage back to Prophet Mohammed. Their traditional professions are considered impure or dishonorable. The professional groups are at the lowest level of the social hierarchy in Somali society. They live scattered in all parts of the Somali cultural area, but mostly in cities (SEM May 31, 2017). Madhiban can be found all over Somalia, but especially in the north of the country (SEMG November 8, 2017). A V. a. The collective term known in the north for some professional groups is Gabooye, which includes Tumal, Madhiban, Muse Dheriyo and Yibir (SEM May 31, 2017).

Madhiban are sometimes exposed to severe discrimination. An example of disadvantage can be seen in the conflict over Galkacyo, where the Madhiban were disadvantaged by humanitarian organizations. Since the Madhiban were refused admission to IDP camps there, with the help of some relatives in the diaspora they organized the purchase of suitable land in Galkacyo in order to accommodate Madhiban IDPs. In August 2017, the Tumal did the same as the Madhiban (SEMG November 8, 2017).

Today the situation for the Gabooye has improved compared to the turn of the millennium, when they could not even go to school normally. Attitudes towards them have become more positive, especially among young Somali people; It is now common for many members of the majority clans to speak, eat, work and maintain friendships with members of professional groups. There are no targeted attacks or ill-treatment against the Gabooye (SEM May 31, 2017).

Only in the question of mixed marriages is there still any social discrimination, since majority clans usually do not accept mixed marriages with members of professional groups. It is seen as particularly problematic when a majority woman marries a minority man. The reverse is less of a problem. Mixed marriages are extremely rare - especially the last-mentioned constellation. However, there are evidently regional differences: In the north of the Somali cultural area, which is more homogeneous in terms of clans, mixed marriages are both rarer and more stigmatized than in the south. Hawiye and Rahanweyn see the question of intermarriage less closely. In addition, the pressure on mixed marriages is particularly pronounced in rural areas (SEM May 31, 2017).

If a mixed marriage occurs, the person concerned is often repudiated by their own family members (of the majority clan). They no longer visit them, do not look after their children, or break off contact altogether; there is social pressure. The interviewees on the fact-finding mission affirmed that under such circumstances there is almost no violence or even killing. Rare incidents of violence in Somaliland in connection with mixed marriages are documented in Somaliland media (SEM May 31, 2017).

Overall, however, the social level and the associated poverty is the main problem for many. In addition, these minorities are generally less organized and tend to have poorer knowledge of the legal system. The access of professional groups to education is difficult because, for example, there are no schools in their places of residence. In addition, many children leave school early to work. Many families are dependent on this type of income. The mostly poorer education, in turn, disadvantages minority members when looking for work, where membership of a clan can often lead to discrimination. Since they have a small diaspora, members of professional groups also benefit less from international transfers than the majority clans (SEM May 31, 2017).

Nevertheless, some members of the professional groups are also economically successful. They still make up the poorest section of the population; nevertheless there are minority members in governments, in parliament and in business. (SEM May 31, 2017).

Members of other clans in the minority position

Members of "strong" clans can also become minorities. This is the case when they live in an area where another clan is dominant. This can affect individuals or entire groups. For example, the Biyomaal, as an exposed Dir clan in southern Somalia, sometimes see themselves in this role. As a general rule, an individual is always in the "minority" role when he or she is on the territory of another clan. She loses the privileges associated with her clan membership. She is considered a "guest" in the territory, which puts her in a weaker position than the "hosts". In this system of "hosts and guests", people who settle outside their own clan territory are in a worse position than members of the clan resident there. In Mogadishu, for example, members of the Isaaq, Rahanweyn and Darod are considered "guests". This system also applies to IDPs (SEM May 31, 2017). IDPs who belong to a minority clan are doubly disadvantaged. Since they often cannot fall back on usable clan connections or on the protection of a clan, they are exposed to discrimination (USDOS 3 March 2017).

In most areas, the dominant clan excludes other groups from effectively participating in government institutions (USDOS 3/3/2017). In principle, discrimination in the light of the respective clan or subclan membership can also be assumed in the areas controlled by the government. This can be economic discrimination, for example in the context of state procurement procedures, but also discrimination in access to food aid, natural resources, health services or other government services (AA 1.1.2017), access to the labor market or legal proceedings (USDOS 03/03/2017 ). Members of a (sub) clan can also encounter considerable difficulties in areas dominated by another (sub) clan, especially in conflict situations regarding accidents, property or water (AA 1.1.2017).

The Ashraf and the Sheikhal are known as religious clans. The Ashraf derive their religious status from the descent they claim to be the daughter of the Prophet; the Sheikhal from an inherited religious status (EASO 8/2014).

The Ashraf and Sheikhal are traditionally respected and protected by the clans with whom they live. The Sheikhal are also closely associated with the Hawiye / Hirab clan and even have some Hawiye seats in the Somali parliament. Part of the Ashraf lives as part of the Benadiri in the coastal cities, part as the Digil / Mirifle clan in the river valleys of Bay and Bakool (EASO 8/2014).

Basic service / economy

In general, Somalia would have great economic potential, be it in agro-business, cattle breeding, fishing or trading, with renewable or other energy sources. In addition, Somalia has very entrepreneurial citizens, both in the country and in the diaspora. This potential would exist (UNSOM 9/13/2017). The diaspora has also been investing in different ways across Somalia for several years (SHU 16.6.2016). It is estimated that the diaspora transfers more than $ 1.3 billion home each year. This means that the Somali economy is also one of the most remiss-dependent economies in the world (SHU June 16, 2017).

But Somalia is still one of the poorest countries on earth. A significant part of the population cannot get enough food and drinking water (AA 4.2017b). Periodically recurring periods of drought with hunger crises and the extremely inadequate health care as well as inadequate access to clean drinking water and the lack of a functioning sewage system have made Somalia the country with the greatest need for international emergency aid for decades (AA 1.1.2017; cf. AA 4.2017b). So the country is highly dependent on aid (UNSOM 9/13/2017). 43% of the Somali population live in extreme poverty on less than one US dollar a day (UNHRC 9/6/2017).

A lack of data makes it difficult to adequately describe the macro-economic situation in Somalia. According to estimates, GDP increased by 5% in 2015 and by 6% in 2016. The forecast for 2017 is for growth of 2.5%.

This growth mainly arose in urban areas and is dependent on consumption, remittances and donor funds (WB July 18, 2017).

Access to education and work is a challenge in many areas (ÖB 9.2016). The given GDP growth is an urban phenomenon in Somalia, driven by consumption, aid from abroad and remittances from the diaspora. The ban on the use of the Somali Shilling issued by al Shabaab in June 2017 in three federal states has had a negative effect, the exchange rate of the currency has fallen (UNSC 5.9.2017; see SEMG November 8, 2017). One of the reasons for the ban on al Shabaab was certainly the unregulated and unauthorized reprinting of banknotes by the State Bank of Puntland (SEMG November 8, 2017).

There are different figures on the level of youth unemployment in Somalia. On the Human Development Index 2012, general unemployment was given as 54%, for young people (14-29 year olds) with 67% (ÖB 9.2016; see SHU 16.6.2017). UNDP gave the figure in 2012 as 67%. In the current study from 2016, however, only 14.3% of the young people surveyed (Mogadishu 6%, Kismayo 13%, Baidoa 24%) stated that they were currently unemployed.This may be due to the following reasons: a) that the situation in these three cities is different than in other parts of Somalia; b) that economic development has improved the situation since 2012; c) that there are now more underemployed people; d) that the definition of "unemployed" is unclear (e.g. informal sector) (IOM 2.2016). In addition, according to other information, many men are more or less unable to work due to their khat consumption - one reason why women often have to step in as family supporters (SZ 13.2.2017).

In any case, all of this means that unemployment in Somalia and Mogadishu cannot be quantified (LI 1.4.2016). Overall, reliable data on the economy are impossible to obtain or verify (ÖB 9.2016). In addition, previous studies of how people in Mogadishu make a living have focused on the most vulnerable groups in the city: IDPs and the urban poor. It is characteristic of these groups that they receive humanitarian assistance. They make up about 20% of the population of Mogadishu. These groups benefit from draws to a very small extent (2% of those surveyed; Somali general population: 30%). The men of these populations often work in transportation, at the port, and as construction workers; Women work as domestic servants. Another source of income for these groups is retail trade - especially in agricultural products. In addition, they receive food aid and other services through charitable organizations (LI 1.4.2016).

In any case, the government does not provide any support for the unemployed (LI 1.4.2016). In an IOM study, unemployed young people (14-30 years) stated that they were primarily cared for by their families in Somalia (60%) and relatives abroad (27%) (IOM 2.2016). Overall, traditional law (xeer) is a social safety net, a type of social and accident insurance. In addition to the nuclear family, the jilib appears [note:

roughly the lowest level of the clan system] to be largely responsible for covering emergencies. If a person needs support, they turn to the Jilib or - depending on the extent - to lower levels (e.g. extended family) (SEM May 31, 2017).

In 2015 an economic boom was registered in the port of Mogadishu. Thanks to the reduced threat of piracy and the resulting improved security situation, more and more investors are interested in Mogadishu. However, the Somali economy in general remains fragile. This has to do with the narrow economic base. The majority of the population is still dependent on animal husbandry and fishing and is therefore particularly exposed to external and environmental influences (ÖB 9.2016).

It can be assumed that there are many more job opportunities in Mogadishu than in other parts of Somalia. The economic reconstruction requires both experienced, trained workers and young people without education or work experience (LI 1.4.2016). There is an increasing demand for unskilled labor in the city. In the past, the untrained found it more difficult to find work. With the growing purchasing power of the population, the demand for services, e.g. for cleaning staff or other housework, also increases. With the increasing security in Mogadishu, untrained workers from other parts of the country have come to the capital looking for work (IOM 2.2016; see LI 1.4.2016). Accordingly, unskilled workers who are only concerned with physical strength (construction industry, dock workers, etc.) are available in large numbers in Mogadishu. Young candidates are preferred (IOM 2.2016).

There is a great need for the following trained workers and skills - and possibly also for those willing to train: Craftsmen (carpenters, bricklayers, welders, etc.); in the hospitality industry (cooks, waiters, etc.); Cutter; Engineers; medical staff;

advanced IT and computer skills; Agricultural expertise;

Teachers at all levels. There is also a need for the following workers and skills: mechanics, electricians, plumbers, drivers of special vehicles; Business economists and accountants; Sales and marketing; English speakers; IT and computer skills (IOM 2.2016). The shortage of skilled workers is so great that guest workers are resorted to in some areas (e.g. in the hospitality industry on Kenyans and Somali countries; or in the construction industry on craftsmen from Bangladesh) (LI 1.4.2016; cf. IOM 2.2016).

Almost all employers surveyed by IOM in the study stated that they want to hire more staff in the medium term (IOM 2.2016). Because vacant jobs are often not advertised widely and employers take the clan and relatives into account rather than acquired skills, applicants without proper connections or from minorities and women (IOM 2.2016; cf. DIS 9.2015), widows and migrants without families have poorer chances ( DIS 9.2015). Job seekers use their private networks. Larger companies also post job offers on house walls or in local media. Public bodies also use online media (e.g. baidoanews.net or somalijobs.net). Male laborers make their labor available early in the morning at certain places (Mogadishu: Bakara; Baidoa: Kilo 7; Kismayo: Golol Place) (IOM 2.2016).

The military success against al Shabaab in Mogadishu has meant that many Somali have returned from the diaspora (BS 2016; see LI 1.4.2016). The returnees have invested and at the same time created growing demand (LI 1.4.2016). In addition, new investors came to the fore, e.g. Turkey (BS 2016; see LI 1.4.2016), China and the Gulf States (LI 1.4.2016). Mogadishu's economy has started to grow. This is most evident in the face of the building boom (BS 2016). Today Mogadishu is characterized by reconstruction, economic recovery and optimism (LI 1.4.2016). Supermarkets, restaurants and hotels were reopened. The number of economic activities is also increasing in other cities wrested from al Shabaab (BS 2016).

Many UN agencies (e.g. UN-Habitat, UNICEF, UNHCR) are actively rebuilding the country (ÖB 9.2016). The UN currently operates 18 youth programs in Somalia and has invested US $ 28 million there. Seven of these programs support (vocational) training to reduce youth unemployment (UNSC 5.9.2017). The Somalia Stability Fund operates infrastructure projects in Hobyo, Xudur and Berdale - this has created jobs. UNDP and UNIDO support young people in Jubaland in order to increase their job opportunities - for example through training and microcredits. A new store was opened in Afmadow with the support of USAID. USAID also supports reconstruction at community level, including in the districts of Kismayo, Baardheere and Diinsoor (UNSC 5.9.2017).

Most of Somalia's income comes from cattle exports, skins, fish, charcoal and bananas. Telecommunications are a key element of the economy. In addition, since the withdrawal of al Shabaab from Mogadishu, some areas have grown significantly: public administration; international organizations; Embassies; the construction sector; and the service sector (hotels, restaurants, transport sector, schools, hospitals, etc.) (LI 1.4.2016). Many areas are in the hands of private providers (LI 1.4.2016; see BS 2016). In addition to schools and hospitals, for example, tax is also collected by a private company. According to calculations, the Somali economy has grown steadily; The IMF estimates growth at 3.7% for 2014 (LI 1.4.2016). The fishing industry would also be a potential growth sector. Somali territorial waters are home to some of the richest fishing grounds in the world. There is still a lack of training for fishermen, equipment and regulations. OXFAM and the EU support the expansion of capacities in this regard (OXFAM 9/30/2015).

Due to the fact that a number of Somali refugees are already willing to return voluntarily, there is justified hope of qualifying the country as increasingly safer and more habitable (ÖB 9.2016).

Drought situation

Four consecutive rainy seasons have failed. This drought has resulted in almost total crop failure and reduced job opportunities in rural areas. The drought has created shortages of water and pasture land - and, as a result, of livestock being lost. In particular, poorer households have problems being able to pay the sharply increased prices for staple foods; and on the other hand, they can hardly earn any income by selling cattle (WB 07/18/2017). Three years of drought have created a humanitarian crisis. Food shortages, child mortality and malnutrition affect more than half of the population. Around 60% of the livestock was destroyed, with livestock breeding representing the main income of large sections of the population (UNHRC 9/6/2017). The drought affects all economic activities in Somalia, including agriculture, livestock and fishing. In the meantime, the economic effects of the drought are also making a substantial contribution to the federal budget (UNSC 5.9.2017). However, the damage to life and living conditions - especially for women, children and the disadvantaged - is enormous (UNSOM 9/13/2017). For the future, we are working on programs to develop resilience to future periods of drought (UNSC 5.9.2017).

The basic supply of the population with food is not guaranteed (AA 1.1.2017). The supply situation is persistently poor due to low crop yields and dry periods. Due to the difficult security situation and restrictions caused by the activities of various militias, it is a challenge for humanitarian organizations to reach disadvantaged sections of the population (ÖB 9.2016).

At the beginning of 2017, the humanitarian situation in Somalia had deteriorated at an alarming rate. The Somali President declared a national emergency on February 28, 2017 and asked for more help from the international community (UNSC May 9, 2017). On February 2nd, 2017, a pre-famine alert was issued for Somalia. After that, humanitarian activities were ramped up (SEMG November 8, 2017). Most recently, on December 5, 2017, the Puntland government declared a state of emergency and asked for food and water deliveries (VOA December 5, 2017).

Due to the situation, the Somali government, in cooperation with humanitarian forces, has already switched planning from a drought response to famine prevention (UNHRC September 6, 2017). Only the rapid support of international humanitarian partners and Somali organizations prevented a famine (SEMG November 8, 2017). Deaths from hunger were only reported very sporadically, for example in January 2017 from Bay (UNSOM 16.1.2017) and Gedo (SMN 15.1.2017) as well as in March 2017 from Bay (BBC 4.3.2017).

However, there is still a risk of famine (FEWS 12/30/2017; see UNSOM 9/13/2017, UNHCR 11/30/2017b). The Gu rains (March-June) were again weak on average, in Somaliland and Puntland they reached almost normal values. In some areas the risk of famine has increased and food security will not improve until the end of 2017. In the regions of Galgaduud, Gedo, Mudug, Middle and Lower Shabelle, deterioration is even expected. In some areas the situation has eased, but due to the length of this drought, an actual recovery can only be assumed after two consecutive periods of good rainfall (UNSC 5.9.2017). Even if the worst has been prevented so far (UNNS September 13, 2017; see UNSC September 5, 2017), there is still a risk of famine in the second half of 2017 (UNSC September 5, 2017). The Deyr rains towards the end of 2017 were also below average in most parts of the country. Only a few limited areas in central Somalia and along the Ethiopian border showed average or above-average rainfall (FEWS 3.1.2018).

In the first trimester of 2017, 6.2 million people were affected by acute food insecurity, of which almost three million were in need of acute life-saving help (UNSC 9/5/2017). As a result, the situation has deteriorated and the number of people in need of assistance has risen to 6.7 million. Of these, 3.2 million need acute life-saving help (UNSC 5.9.2017). 70% of the people in immediate need of help are in southern / central Somalia, where access is hindered by security problems and al Shabaab (UNHRC 9/6/2017); this affected areas both outside and under the control of al Shabaab. While the group had contributed significantly to the high number of 260,000 starvation deaths due to its blockade during the famine in 2011, this time al Shabaab distributed aid supplies itself - also for propaganda purposes. This affected areas in Bay, Bakool, Galgaduud, Hiiraan, Lower Shabelle and Mudug. On the other hand, humanitarian aid from outside was hindered or blocked this time too; the collection of taxes has increased; humanitarian workers have been abducted; and relief supplies to roadblocks are taxed. After all, this time refugees were granted onward travel in some cases before the drought. Authorities have also hindered the work of humanitarian forces in various ways (SEMG November 8, 2017; see USDOS 3 March 2017). Reports predict that 6.2 million people - and thus half of the population - will be dependent on aid in 2018 (UNHCR 11/30/2017b).

Around 900,000 children are acutely malnourished (UNHRC 9/6/2017). The number of acutely malnourished children could rise to 1.4 million by the end of 2017, including 275,000 with severe - life-threatening - acute malnutrition (UNHRC 9/6/2017; see UNSC 5/9/2017). By June 2017, almost 400,000 affected people had been treated and more than 173,000 children received support so that they can continue to attend school. A total of three million people were reached through support, partly also through money programs (UNSC 5.9.2017). The UNHCR alone reached more than 800,000 people between 11.2016 and 11.2017 (UNHCR 30.11.2017b). Over 80% of food aid comes from money and vouchers (SEMG November 8, 2017). 225 feeding centers have been set up. In the period January-August 2017, access to clean water was guaranteed for 3.5 million people. AMISOM has also carried out water drilling. 18.5 million head of cattle were treated and 2.8 million people were helped (UNSC 5.9.2017). As early as April 2017, access to food was improved for 1.7 million people. In March 2017 alone, 332,000 children received nutritional treatment. Al Shabaab continues to hinder access to people in need in the area under the control of this group (UNSC 9/5/2017). Thanks to the quick and generous contributions, the worst could be prevented. Will be over per month